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Introductions that focus on my multiple claims to your
attention remind me uncomfortably of an encounter I had
with a wealthy, retired Greek shopkeeper on the tiny
Dodecanese island of Simi. His attempts at gracious entertainment of my group (already made difficult by our need
for an interpreter) were repeatedly interrupted by his newly adult nephew, recently back from many years of foreign
studies, first in Munich and later in London. When the
young man left at last, our interpreter praised the young
man's extraordinary linguistic fluency. The old man raised
his eyebrows, shrugged and said "Now he's ignorant in
three languages."
We honor you today for your demonstrated fluency in an
alien tongue. But my anecdote is not the theme-at least not
the main theme-of my remarks today. In the 15 to 20
minutes I have been given, it would be pretentious to
attempt to educate, edify, or subvert you. If my colleagues
have failed to do these things in the last three years, it is
surely too late now. I wish instead to comfort some of you
and annoy others with an outsider's view of the lawyer's
role. I say outsider because I am not a lawyer, merely a
member of the guild by association.
My topic is "Legal Success and Legal Failure," but I shall
talk chiefly about legal success. With the iceberg whose tip
was Watergate so plainly in mind there is little chance of
our forgetting legal failure. My principal point is that legal
success or failure is not correlated with the individual
lawyers success, financial or forensic.. When I say not correlated I mean both that it is not correlated positively and
that it is not correlated negatively.
I urge you to reject the view of a legal career as a choice
between, on the one hand, honor without profits (perhaps
in the form of the sack cloth of pro bona work) and, on the
other hand, of profits without honor (in league perhaps with
the firm of Cravath, Cutler, and Ellis). I do not denigrate the
virtues of low-paid legal or public service, of doing good instead of doing well in Washington, in Ypsilanti, or in Hattiesburg, but I shall not focus on it now.
I want to suggest an economist's view of traditional legal
employments. That view starts with the economist's view of
the world. Economists have a small number of important insights. Two that I remember are: First, that markets work,
and second, that ma:rkets fail. There is a vital role, albeit not
the same role, for lawyers in each circumstance.

Market Success

Let's start with market success, whose ambit is the range
of activities where private pursuit of selfish gain promotes
the public welfare. Markets often do work, but I shall not today help you count the ways. The realm of market success is
the realm of free competitive interchange and trade, and its
praises have been often sung, never more eloquently than
by an otherwise forgotten 19th century economist (Bascom)
who described this world as "more provocative of virtue
than virtue herself." In this world, however, Adam Smith's
invisible hand is likely to be guiding the economy from
within the lawyer's glove.
When economists speak of "gains from trade," they mean
the gains from specialization that can not be realized unless
efficient trade is there as well. The lawyers role here is
fa cilita tive : the contracts, the property rights, and the
institutions that make exchange possible and efficient
re quire negotiation, effectuation, and enforcement.
Economists often speak of transactions costs-sometimes
they speak of them as if they were an impediment to the
transaction- and it may thus appear that the label "transacion cost" is pejorative. Not so; costs, here and generally,

are payments necessary for the use of factors of production,
and factors of production are essential to the output produced. Such transactions costs, both that part incurred by
private parties to the transactions and that paid by taxpayers as part of the institutional infrastructure in which
the transactions occur, are payments for valuable services
rendered. They are not one bit less worthy than the costs of
raw materials, of factory labor, of machinery, or of quality
control. To be sure, in a world without transactions costs
one might not need lawyers, but so to say is no more interesting than to say that in a world without friction the
wheel would exist only to amuse small children, and that
we would not need energy to move goods and people from
place to place. I can not emphasize this point enough: the
services of lawyers, judges, process servers, are neither ornamental nor inherently wasteful-but vital to the workings
of a market system. Obviously such costs, as any other class
of costs, can be excessively high, but given reasonable
choice and given competition, there is certainly at least a
strong presumption that people not only pay for value
received, but pay little more than is required.
Thus, even if you decline to wear a T-shirt saying "I am a
transaction cost," relax. Be not dismayed if you are but the
grease of commerce. You need not feel noble to be noble.
Where markets work it is the alchemy of Adam Smith not
altruism or self-abnegation that converts the long green to
the true blue.
Market Failure
I turn to market failure. There are many kinds of welldefined market failure . Monopoly is one. Presence of externalities (third party effects) that, being outside the market,
are improperly considered is another. Perhaps most important of all is the existence of so-called collective consumption goods, including not only national defense and
hurricane warning systems but also more ephemeral things
like justice, for which there is no effective economic market
in which to register demands or to induce supply.
In coping with each of these forms of market failure,
lawyers play central roles. A major reason is that correction
of market failure typically requires government activity,
and lawyers dominate governmental processes, not only the

judiciary, but the legislatures, the regulatory agencies, and
the top administrative positions. The reasons for the domain of the lawyer being much greater than is strictly
necessary are of some importance to my thesis. A popular
but cynical explanation is that "it takes one to know one"
and that only lawyers are evil-minded enough to cope with
anti-social behavior. This is superficial, and thus likely
wrong. I would not, however, go so far as to reject wholly
the maxim of Stanley Surrey (when he was reforming taxes
at the Treasury) that while politicians, economists, and law
professors might be trusted to tell him what to do, only expensive private tax lawyers were competent to tell him how
to do it.
There is a more fundamental reason for legal dominance
of the correction of market failure . It is that in the area
where markets fail, virtually every decision is
redistributive- one group cannot usually be made better
off without making another worse off. Hence, one cannot
avoid the quicksand of interpersonal equity. It is necessary
to decide not only what, but who. Who shall gain and who
shall lose? Economists, obsessed by allocation, tend to be
impatient with the questions of distribution: inefficiency
not inequity is their bete noir. As the distinguished
Jamaican economist W. Arthur Lewis put it: "Equity is the
mother of confusion."
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Reformers, lobbyists, and true believers ignore the
problem of redistribution, while economists label it "2nd
order," which is our technical phrase for something we are
about to neglect. Lawyers embrace redistribution; they
revel and cavort in the quicksand where others sink. Why
do the rest of us tolerate it, indeed foster it? It is not (as you
may have believed) because of your innate godlike
qualities, nor because of your wisdom, or your purity of
heart and purpose. Nor even because of your certification
by a Committee on Character and Fitness. It is instead the
general (if only implicitly perceived) acceptance of the key
legal (but non-economic) value: process is vital to the integrity of outcome. One can reasonably decide who only by
exquisite attention to procedure. How is a matter decided,
how reviewed, how appealed? Decisions in the non-market
sector are inherently adversarial. Decisions are made
legitimately-sometimes badly, sometimes well-only if
there is opportunity for ardent advocacy. Because of this,
both the deciders and the pleaders must know how to use
and (surely no less) how to disabuse the tricks and traps and
rules of advocacy.
There is reinforcing additional factor in the lawyer's role:
a central question that is prelude to policy action is the actual existence (as distinct from the theoretical possibility)
of market failure, and it is a question likely to be in dispute.
The identification of market failure of familiar and of novel
kinds, the difficult tasks of distinguishing between market
failure and market success in the activities of giant firms
and petty tradesmen, of public agencies and private groups,
each requires disputation, advocacy and, ultimately, resolution in procedurally acceptable ways. These ways, which
alone confer legitimacy, are the special domain of the legal
process. Here, neither more nor less than in the area of
facilitating market function, these activities are for the
public welfare not because of the motives of the advocates
or their clients-which may be venal or crass as often as
noble-but because of the process. Process cannot assure
integrity of outcome, but it alone can make it possible.
Legal Success
Legal success, in my sense, arises both where markets
work and where markets fail by making efficient, fair, and
even wise decisions possible. That this has relatively little
to do with the efficiency, fairness, or wisdom of the advocate is (perhaps surprisingly) a matter of some comfort.
These are attributes in short and uncertain supply, and it
would be unfortunate if we had to depend upon them.
Legal systems fail, not when lawyers become venal or
rich by using the arts of advocacy to the fullest, but only
when they subvert the process. A skilled advocate can
become a dangerous despot. It can happen here.
I've delayed the awarding of your honors long enough. I
congratulate you collectively but none the less warmly. I
hope that you may prove to deserve the honors. You will if
you contribute to the success of the legal system and/or expose its failures.
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